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European Antidumping Law
and Procedure
DIETER OLDEKOP & IVO VAN BAEL
DR. OLDEKOP
The question of protection against dumping cannot
be completely isolated from economic policy considerations. And it is
impossible to overlook the present economic conditions in our coun-
tries when you look at dumping or antidumping law as it is practiced.
That does not mean that protection against dumping should be al-
lowed to degenerate into protectionism. There is certainly a very
strong difference between protection and protectionism. It has taken
a long time to put antidumping measures behind the bars of com-
monly accepted rules. I am referring here to the Antidumping Code
of GATT, and everybody knows that it would be disastrous to go back
to the state of affairs before the adoption of that Code. The position of
the European Commission in that regard has been made clear, very
clear, on quite a number of occasions. For example, there are the
statements made by Vice-President Haferkamp in a recent debate in
the European Parliament which dealt with a motion on "The Prac-
tice of Dumping and the Threat Posed to Europe by Uncontrolled
Competition." And you can see from the title of that motion that it
favored rather radically protectionist measures.
In that debate, the Vice-President of the Commission said, among
other things, that dumping cases are subject to legal provisions and
rules. "We have observed these and shall continue to observe them,
and we cannot stick the dumping label on everything that we find
inconvenient. We cannot fish the dumping label out of the drawer
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whenever competition gets awkward. We must ask ourselves
whether it would not be better to improve our own competitive abil-
ity." I think that's quite clear. And I might add that in the debate,
practically all political groups spoke out clearly against the protec-
tionist attitudes which were expressed in the motion. And these pro-
tectionist elements were then eliminated in the resolution of the Par-
liament which was finally adopted.1
But sticking to the rules does not mean that antidumping policy
could remain isolated from the economic conditions which prevail.
When exporting industries are faced with declining demand and de-
cining prices in domestic markets, they will generally be less reluc-
tant to keep up production levels by resorting to something like
dumping. At the same time the industries injured by low-price im-
ports will turn more frequently to the authorities which administer
antidumping laws and ask for help, and, in such a situation, these
authorities will normally be more inclined to make use of the legal
possibilities to give such relief. The result will be all the more signifi-
cant, first, if there is a large range of discretion whether to grant
protective measures when dumping and injury have been shown,
and second, if these authorities have been rather reluctant in more
prosperous times to make full use of the possibilities they had.
Let me now turn in a more precise way to the antidumping legisla-
tion of the European Communities. When the Commission first sub-
mitted its proposal for an antidumping regulation in 1965 to the
Council of Ministers, that was done for a number of different rea-
sons. First, the legislation of the various member states in this field
was very different. For example, the three Benelux countries did not
have any antidumping rules in the proper sense-they just had gen-
eral safeguard clauses. Second, the differences in national legisla-
tion would have had a very negative effect on the coherence of the
Common Market as such. The full customs union and the free move-
ment of goods within the Community could have made it very easy to
circumvent the antidumping measures of individual member states
by indirect importation through other member states. Finally, Com-
munity regulation of dumping was necessary to comply with the
mandate of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty requiring that the EEC
institute a commercial policy by 1970.
One of the main features, I think, which distinguishes the Euro-
pean legislation from the United States legislation is the strong dose
of policy elements in the European antidumping legislation. In this
respect it is important to consider the position of Article 113, which is
the basis for antidumping measures, within the general framework
of the Treaty. It is situated in the part of the Treaty which is entitled,
"The Policy of the Community," and, more specifically, in the chap-
ter which deals with commercial policies. This policy orientation, or
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leitmotiv if you wish, is reiterated in the preamble of the antidump-
ing regulation, which was finally adopted in 1968, where it is said
that protective measures against dumping or the granting of boun-
ties or subsidies are an important part of the common commercial
policy.2 But even more importantly, a number of features of the sys-
tem set up by the regulation make it clear that considerations of
economic policy play a considerable role in the concept and applica-
tion of this system, and that it is less of an administrative system
than that established by the United States.
This corresponds to the position which the Community adopted in
the negotiations which led to the adoption of the Antidumping Code
in the GATT. I am referring to three features of the system: first, the
distribution of authority in the decision-making process among Com-
munity institutions-that is to say, the Council and the Commission
on the one hand, and member states on the other hand; second, the
margin of discretion concerning the adoption of protective measures
once injury from dumping has been established; third, the nature of
the legal acts by which protective measures are taken.
With regard to the first point, it is important that the final word on
the question of whether or not protective measures are to be taken-
and that, after all, is the real policy issue in these cases-lies to a
large extent with the Council of Ministers, the highest political level
of decision-making within the Community. This is true both in cases
where the Commission, after it has terminated its investigation,
comes to the conclusion that there should be no protective measures,
and in cases where it determines that there should be protective
measures. In the case of a negative conclusion, the Commission may
terminate its investigation, but only if there are no objections raised
within the EC Antidumping Committee, which is comprised of repre-
sentatives of the member states. If there are objections within that
Committee, then the matter is referred to the Council of Ministers,
which can request that the Commission resume the examination. 3
The same procedure is followed where an antidumping procedure is
to be terminated because of a satisfactory price undertaking by the
enterprises concerned. 4 In case of a positive conclusion-that is to
say, where the Commission arrives at the conclusion that there
should be protective measures-the Council also decides on the im-
position of antidumping duties.
5
The implementation of provisional measures is of course a decision
of the Commission, but the Council again has the power either to
confirm that decision or to choose a different action. 6 Furthermore, it
is the council that decides about the possible prolongation of provi-
sional measures,7 and about the final collection of duties which had
been collected under provisional antidumping measures." I am not
going to continue this enumeration of instances in which the Council
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has the last word, but it shows, at any rate, that the Council has
retained its basic powers under Article 113 in the antidumping proce-
dure. This underlines the importance that is given to these measures,
and the policy character that they have, even though in practice the
Commission may have a strong position vis-d-vis the Council. After
all, the Council may in most cases decide on a course of action differ-
ent from that envisaged by the Commission only by a qualified major-
ity, and sometimes that is not very easy to get.
The second point that I wanted to mention refers to the margin of
discretion left to the Commission and to the Council with regard to
the adoption of protective measures. The imposition of antidumping
duties is never mandatory under Community law. It is not a statute
in which the remedy is built in; therefore, even if the existence of
dumping and injury has been clearly established, the Council and
the Commission can still refrain from imposing an antidumping
duty. The criterion for the decision is whether the interests of the
Community call for intervention.9 A similar assessment, by the way,
has to be made by the Commission at the time it opens an antidump-
ing procedure, because the rule says that only where the information
received by the Commission shows that protective measures against
dumping may be necessary and only then, is the Commission under a
duty to continue the examination of the matter.'0 These rules consti-
tute a large opening for the influence of policy considerations into the
Community's procedure. This is certainly different from the United
States situation. In practice, the Commission has tried right from the
start to avoid opening procedures where these would lead to mea-
sures which, in the light of the general Community interest, would
be undesirable. Additionally, there have been cases where the proce-
dure was already initiated, but where antidumping duties were not
imposed despite strong evidence of dumping and injury.
The third point which I mentioned in the beginning refers to the
nature of the legal acts by which these measures are implemented.
According to the rules, it is done by regulations, not decisions." Regu-
lations are defined by the EEC Treaty as being of general application,
binding in their entirety, and as being directly applicable in all mem-
ber states; 12 therefore, they are essentially acts of a legislative nature,
not of an administrative nature. Regulations are traditionally used to
implement the Community's commercial policies; for example, the
common customs tariff and all other policy measures concerning im-
ports and exports are defined and put into force by regulations. These
measures must apply to all importers, whether they are known or
unknown at the time the measures are adopted. They are different
from the decisions with which, for example, the Community imple-
ments antitrust measures. Those are individual decisions directed or
addressed to individual enterprises. The nature of these legal acts
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reflects also on some other questions as well; for example, to what
extent must the Community institutions give reasons for the regula-
tions, and also to what extent are they subject to legal remedies.
Now, some words on the practical impact of our legislation. First,
who deals with antidumping matters within the Commission? It is in
principle the Commission as such-the collegium consisting of the
thirteen commissioners-but in a more specific way the antidumping
matters are dealt with by the member of the Commission who is re-
sponsible for external affairs. Within the Commission Service, there is
an Antidumping Division which has about, all in all, twenty-five offi-
cials. That is certainly a small unit. Its smallness is to some extent
compensated for by the fact that it can rely on other departments in
the Commission for economic data on the industries concerned, and
also, of course, for legal advice. Moreover, it is in permanent contact
with the experts of the member states, who are responsible for imple-
menting-for really executing-the antidumping measures adopted
by the Community. Now, by way of statistics, you might be interested
to know that from 1970, which was the first year in which we had a
case under our antidumping law, until now, the Commission has offi-
cially opened antidumping procedures in about 116 cases-and that
includes cases under the European Coal and Steel Community. The
figure of 116 is based on the number of exporting countries per prod-
uct. If you take multicountry cases as one case, then the figure is only
fifty-four. Of these, approximately three quarters have in the mean-
time been officially terminated -the great majority of them because
settlements were reached with the exporters. In only sixteen cases
have definitive antidumping duties been imposed-all of them, by the
way, since November, 1977. The rest of the procedures are still
pending.Let me also note that, all in all, only about one-third of the
complaints introduced led to the official opening of antidumping
procedures; the rest were rejected.
Now, from these statistics I think one can discern three trends.
First, the Community applied its legislation with great reserve. If I
am right, between 1970 and mid-1977 the figures in the United
States were something like two hundred antidumping investigations
and seventy countervailing duty investigations.
Second, there has been a preference for terminating antidumping
procedures by settlements with the exporters, rather than by impos-
ing antidumping duties. This approach has an express legal basis in
the Antidumping Code and in our regulations. It is sufficiently effec-
tive. It normally saves time, and, of course, it is also financially more
beneficial for the exporters than is the imposition of antidumping
duties.
Thirdly, there has been a significant increase in the number of
antidumping procedures and duties in the last two years. That is due,
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as I said in the beginning, to developments in the general economic
situation, to changes in the steel sector, and to the introduction of a
basic price system by the Community. This is our version of the
trigger price system, and it was introduced after the United States
announced that it would adopt its trigger price system. I will not
describe this system in detail. I would just like to say that the under-
cutting of the basic prices is just prima facie evidence of dumping,
and that it doesn't take away any obligation of the Community to go
through the normal procedures. We have a number of court cases
now in the antidumping field, but all of them are still sub judice.
Therefore, a number of questions, which relate to the procedures
adopted and to the possibility of attacking Community measures di-
rectly before the court, have not yet been decided. It seems that we
will have to await the outcome of these court cases for clarification.
MR. VAN BAEL
I am very grateful to have the floor for a few minutes because, as a
practitioner, the dish served by the Commission is a bit too sweet,
and I would like to add a few bitters to give you a more realistic
picture.
Looking back on ten years of enforcement-and Dr. Oldekop con-
firms my views-one notices that Community authorities have opted
for a policy of negotiating settlements rather than investigating mat-
ters in depth to establish a finding of dumping and injury. Dr. Oldekop
mentioned some 116 cases. I would leave the block of steel cases
aside, because they all came about earlier this year as a clear measure
of commercial policy, where the antidumping regulation was used as
an instrument to cause foreign governments to enter into bilateral
agreements. So I think those cases are quite special, and I'm hopeful
will remain exceptional and shouldn't cloud the picture I want to pre-
sent to you. So, basically, I'm talking about the fifty-five cases which
have been handled by the Commission, out of which only four ever
went to affirmative findings and a majority of the others ended with
price assurances. As a practitioner, I have had problems with price
assurances because the basic elements of a price assurance are the
unilateral promise by the exporters to raise their prices in successive
steps, over a number of months, combined with anti-evasion provi-
sions and with reporting requirements. I have also run into a case
where the arrangement which the Commission proposed to my client
went further and included a provision limiting quantities. In this re-
gard one must be careful, whenever the price assurances are submit-
ted in draft form, to eliminate whatever is not proper under the anti-
dumping regulation, because quota arrangements fall under quite a
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different legislation and are more difficult, politically speaking, to ob-
tain. Therefore, an antidumping regulation should not become the
means to more easily obtain quotas.
Looking at the pros and cons of the settlement approach, it will be
obvious to anyone that the great advantage for the interested parties
is that, on the average, everything is over within six months. It also
requires very little staff on the part of the Commission-only a
smoke-filled room. In fact, I remember that in 1973 one of those
sessions went on until three o'clock in the morning. And when I
made a head count of the Commission's staff-the professionals-a
year ago, I counted only five, not twenty-five. Their number may
have doubled since last year, but I guess the twenty-five figure men-
tioned by Dr. Oldekop includes clerical staff as well. So it's quick, it
requires little staff, and the exporters avoid getting the stigma of
dumping stuck on their backs, so they're happy.
What I'm wondering, though, is whether the emphasis on obtain-
ing price assurances hasn't unduly stimulated inflationary pressures
to the detriment of consumers. Several times I have had clients walk
out of my office very happy about the settlement with the Commis-
sion because they could still export the same quantities and get a
better price. Who would quarrel with such a formula, except maybe
consumers? Therefore, to safeguard their interests, it might be a
good idea to have the exact terms of the secret price assurances
which are accepted by the Community authorities made public, so
that users and ultimate consumers could have an opportunity either
to intervene in the course of the proceedings or possibly to file an
appeal against the end result.
Another possible disadvantage of the settlement approach, as I see
it, is that it reduces the role of the antidumping regulations to a
mechanism to trigger negotiations. I remember this quite well, for in
the Ferro-chrome case, 13 I had a client whose invoices were all
clean. We went over the whole package and submitted the full case
to the Commission authorities. And so, very confident, I went to the
hearing (which is the climax in the rather simple procedure) and I
found that after half an hour at the hearing, the chairman got rest-
less in his chair and started inducing both sides to start discussions
on the possible arrangements of a settlement. So I told the chairman
that maybe we should first all agree on whether indeed dumping had
gone on. However, that statement of mine was viewed as a little
naive. Tie chairman responded by saying, "Well, you think you're
big on all the invoices you've submitted, but wait until I send an
inspector down to Sweden to investigate your cost of production." I
said, "You can't do that." "Oh, yes I can," he retorted. I said, "You
can't because under the regulation there has to be a 'particular
market situation.' " Now, when you compare the market for
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ferro-chrome in Sweden with the market in the EEC, it's quite com-
parable; we are not talking about an insignificant market. Yet less
than ten days later, there was an inspector in Sweden for one day. He
did not disclose his findings to the client or to myself, and some two
weeks later a provisional duty was levied. I must say, as a partner in
a law firm, I sometimes have trouble figuring out at what cost we are
operating-although I am living in that partnership on a daily basis.
So, I wonder how the Commission inspector in one day can find out
the cost of production in a manner sufficiently precise for the Com-
mission to base a duty on his findings.
Obviously, when Dr. Oldekop a few minutes ago talked about com-
mercial policy and the policy elements, I had sympathy for his posi-
tion. I would only change the word "policy" into "politics." Addition-
ally, I would make the point that it is difficult to compare the situation
in Europe and our new federal government-the Council of Minis-
ters-with your own federal government, because the federal powers
enjoyed by the Council of Ministers are of course extremely limited,
and there are nine member states-some stronger than others-so you
can imagine how difficult it can sometimes be to reach a compromise
which satisfies both the bigger and the smaller countries.
The last point I would like to mention about the price assurance
approach is that whenever United States companies are involved,
they are extremely hesitant and reluctant even to envisage the possi-
bility of entering into a price assurance because of United States
antitrust considerations. The Kraft Liner case 14 is one example. It's
obviously not my role to say whether United States antitrust laws
would apply to a unilateral undertaking. By way of example, let us
say that I am a United States producer, that there is also a Canadian
producer, and that I know the Commission is going to propose more
or less the same terms to the Canadians as to myself, so that the only
way out for me would be to view the Commission as more or less
imposing a settlement! However, since it's a voluntary undertaking,
I don't know how far the proposals of the Commission will help,
legally speaking, with regard to the United States Antitrust Division.
The composite picture one gets when reading the texts of the four
affirmative findings is rather limited. Unfortunately, they only state
that the Commission has applied the antidumping regulation and
has found dumping and injury to exist. It is a very cryptic, standard-
ized version. It includes only three or four paragraphs for the dump-
ing finding and about the same number of paragraphs for the injury
finding. Once you have read one affirmative determination, you've
read almost all of them.
15
My first critical example is the case of Roller Bearings from
Japan.16 It states both in the provisional and the final ruling, "In
view of the many different types of bearings concerned, the price
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comparison was made on the basis of a certain number of types
representative of the price structure of the products concerned,"
without actually disclosing which types and prices had been com-
pared. When I attended the hearing, the chairman wanted us to give
him the export and home market prices for three very common types
out of some 3,000 types that the Japanese were selling in the EEC.
We ended up giving the data for only one of the three types. Yet on
that basis, two weeks later, the provisional duty was imposed. And
what's even more remarkable is that, for two of the four major pro-
ducers of Japanese bearings, the duty was fixed at ten percent, and
for all the others, the provisional duty was levied at twenty percent-
again without any explanation for the difference in treatment. As a
result, even the producers of miniature bearings going in watches or
spacecraft had to post bond, because an across-the-board dumping
duty was imposed rather than a floor price, so everybody was very
much annoyed by this sudden measure.
Additionally, the Commission stated that in view of the close asso-
ciation between the Japanese exporters and the importers in Eu-
rope-they are, in fact, all affiliated companies-the Commission
constructed the export prices on the basis of the first resale price to
independent buyers, after making due allowance for costs and profits
between importation and resale. But again, the information pub-
lished by the Commission gives no indication whatsoever as to which
amounts were subtracted from such independent resale prices as
costs and profits, to be allocated to the previous level.
In the case of Ferro-chrome from Sweden, 17 the Commission found
that the domestic sales of the Swedish producer were relatively low
compared to its total sales. Consequently, recourse was had to the
criterion of cost of production. Nonetheless, the Commission didn't
say what percentage of the sales of the Swedish producer were on the
Swedish market. In any event, recourse to the third country price or
to a cost of production test can only be had when there is a particular
market situation.' 8 This requirement of the regulation was not fol-
lowed, since as I said, prices and circumstances of sale in Sweden
are completely comparable with those in the EC.
As to requirement of causality, the regulations published by the
Commission hardly give any clue. In fact, in an article I recently had
published, the printer managed to misprint what I had called the
"causal" relationship-the printer turned that into the "casual" rela-
tionship.' 9 At first, I was very much upset about that misprint, but I
thought afterward that that may be a good way of characterizing the
kind of relationship that is involved.
Coming back to Roller Bearings from Japan,20 the injury finding is
completely silent about the impact of the economic recession which
in those days was especially severe in the automobile sector, in view
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of the oil crisis. By the same token, several bearing manufacturers
had gone through considerable technological changes in their manu-
facturing process, which were certainly in part responsible for the
layoffs claimed.
In another case, I retained a firm of economists to go through the
statistics and put the impact of various other possible causes of in-
jury in graphic form. At the hearing, I had the impression that both
the Commission and the European producers found the flip charts I
used very interesting, and since they were unable to refute the points
made, the chairman said that they could respond in writing in a few
weeks so that they would have time to think about the issues we
raised. Yet, two or three weeks later a provisional duty was assessed,
and we have never seen any attempt to respond to the beautiful
charts and graphs plotted by the economists. As a practical lesson, I
no longer suggest to clients that they go to all that very fine trouble,
but rather that the help of a congressman might occasionally prove
to be more effective.
You may wonder how all of these bitter ingredients are possible,
despite the procedural safeguards built into the Antidumping Code.
We have the right of access to the file, but the only thing one gets is the
complaint, nothing about the follow-up and the processing of the com-
plaint. For example, recall the investigation made on the spot during
that one day in Sweden. If we don't get the results of that, what good
does it do to have a right of access to the file? The same thing applies
to the hearing. What good did it do our client when we presented those
charts and graphs, and the chairman said (and the European pro-
ducers agreed) that they would come up with answers to the points we
made, if later on everybody remained silent? And we-can't refer back
to a transcript of what transpired at the hearing, because there isn't
any. So it's just our word against that of the other side.
As to the right of appeal, that issue is now pending before the Court
of Justice; this is a very important point. I obviously disagree with
the analysis made by the Commission representative that antidump-
iug regulations, because of their legal form, are of a legislative or a
rule-making rather than an adjudicatory nature. If you get an anti-
dumping complaint in your hands, the first thing you'll see is that all
the exporters-even very small ones-are mentioned, identified by
name, corporate address, and so on. They get a questionnaire that
may require disclosure of their past conduct, operations, and prop-
erty. In my opinion, the analysis of past conduct is of an adjudicatory
nature. In the provisional assessment of duties on bearings, the four
major Japanese producers were in fact named in the regulation.
Firms should not be deprived of their interest in operating under a
given level of the customs tariff, without at least having had the
opportunity to express their views on a more neutral platform. This is
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not to say that I do not sympathize with the position of Commission
administrators, but between the start of the investigation and the
final proposal made by the Commission to the Council, it is always
the same administrators who are working under fire throughout. And
just as lawyers can get excited about their client's position, I pre-
sume that administrators-civil servants-may also start identifying
the Commission's interests as the goals that they are representing.
DR. OLDEKOP
When I saw Mr. Van Bael pointedly sitting on the other side of the
table, I knew that I had to brace myself. And when he was talking
about smoke-filled rooms, I was wondering whether he wouldn't say
that we had installed special torture chambers in the basement of
the Berlaymont (EC Headquarters). It is impossible, of course, for me
to respond in the short time available to all the criticisms and re-
proaches which have been made against our practice. Of course, Mr.
Van Bael's position and point of view are determined by the position
which he has had in cases vis-&-vis the Commission. It would be nice
to have somebody on the part of the European industries on my side
to help me in rebutting his criticisms.
Now I would just want to make a few comments on what Mr. Van
Bael said. First of all, with regard to our practice of accepting price
arrangements, that is something that is expressly provided for both
by the Antidumping Code 21 and by the EEC antidumping rules.22 It is
a voluntary pricing arrangement, and nobody is forced to give a price
undertaking. On the contrary, it says in our regulation, the fact that
exporters do not offer to give an undertaking or do not accept an
invitation made by the Commission to do so shall in no way be preju-
dicial to the outcome of the case23 -and it isn't. If somebody doesn't
want to give a price undertaking, well then we just continue our
investigation, and there is the possibility of getting judicial review.
I'm coming to that point later on. And as to the argument that price
undertakings reinforce inflation, well, I understand that it would be
the best course of action from that point of view not to have price
arrangements or antidumping duties. Of course, from the point of
view of fighting inflation, that would-at least in the short run-be
the best way to approach these problems. But it would not solve the
problem of injury.
As to the Ferro-chrome example, I think it's sufficient to say that
with regard to that product, measures have also been taken-as far
as I understand, in the United States, and might also be taken in
Japan-so that one can say that we weren't too far off the target
when we took a look at the Ferro-chrome situation.
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Moving on to the Roller Bearings case. That is one of the cases
which is presently being considered by the Court of Justice in Lux-
embourg, and, therefore, I'm rather reserved about going into the
details of that case. I just want to say that it is not correct that we
based our calculations on only three types out of three thousand. We
did, in fact, investigate thirty-six types, which were listed to a large
extent by the Japanese enterprises themselves, and which cover-if I
remember correctly-about 30 to 40 percent of their turnover. So I
think that one cannot say that we have been arbitrary in that regard.
Now, with regard to across-the-board antidumping duties, as far as
provisional antidumping duties are concerned, of course our evalua-
tion of the facts with regard to dumping margins and to injury is
preliminary. It has to be, because the Commission can be under ter-
rific time pressure in these cases. If a member state requests imme-
diate action to be taken by the Commission, the Commission has five
days-five working days-to make up its mind about the imposition
of a duty. And as far as final antidumping duties are concerned, our
technique is to assess duties on a kind of an average. On the other
hand, it is possible for the importers or exporters to claim refunds of
antidumping duties when it is shown that the dumping margin of
their particular imports was less than that which was established by
the Community institutions.
The fact that our reasoning in our regulation does not go as far as
the enterprises sometimes wish is due, as I said, to the fact that we
consider these regulations to be general measures because in fact
they do apply to all the importers of specific products. We feel that we
are in complete compliance with the standards set up for general
measures by the Court of Justice, and we feel that we cannot recite
all of the considerations which we have gone through in the course of
our investigations in the published reasoning of these regulations.
One more word on the question of legal remedies; as I said, we hold
the opinion that a direct complaint to the Court of Justice against
regulations by which we impose antidumping duties is not the correct
way of attacking them. Our position corresponds, more or less, to the
situation which prevails here in the United States. We feel that the
correct way of attacking antidumping measures is before the courts of
the member states-the member states who implement the antidump-
ing measures imposed by the Community institutions. So an importer
who thinks he has reason to complain should address himself to the
national court, attacking the individual assessment of duties against
his imports. There is the possibility that the national court-if it thinks
that the regulation which imposed the antidumping duty is not in
compliance with Community Law-can refer this case to the Court of
Justice in Luxembourg (for a preliminary ruling under Article 177),
which then may review the regulation. Apart from that, as I said,
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there is the possibility of turning to the Commission and claiming a
refund if an importer is not happy.
MR. VAN BAEL
As to price arrangements, the criticism I wanted to make-is that, in
my experience, a number of exporters will not find it in their interest
to fight the conclusion of the price arrangement, because who would
object to selling at higher prices as long as the market would still
allow them to sell their product?
Mr. Oldekop's comment about Ferro-chrome seems to be that if
something is also going on in Japan and in the United States, they
must have been right in Brussels as well. I would say that in the
United States, our client happens to be opposing South African im-
ports of ferro-chrome, and it's not an antidumping proceeding, as I
understand-it's a countervailing duty procedure.
As to my comment that the Commission handed down the provi-
sional decision on the Japanese Roller Bearing case on the basis of
one price comparison out of three thousand, I assume that Mr. Olde-
kop is confused between the provisional decision and the final. I'm
not disputing that between the provisional and the final decisions,
the Commission inspectors did go to Japan and did do a more thor-
ough check. But at the time the provisional across-the-board duty
was set, only one type was known. I have it in writing in correspon-
dence with Dr. Beseler, who heads the Commission staff in this area,
and I presume that that piece is now before the court as part of the
record. And don't forget that in the final ruling, the Council decided
to collect the provisional duties levied, so was it really only a provi-
sional decision? I feel that at the time the Commission handed down
its provisional decision, it did not have adequate facts for reaching
such a farfetched order covering so many producers other than the
four major ones.
As to the reasoning of the four affirmative determinations, so far as
being adequate or not, I would say that the record speaks for itself.
And if you would, for instance, compare the provisional decision in
the Taiwanese Bicycle Chains case with the Japanese Roller Bear-
ings case, you would see that the injury finding is verbatim the
same. 24 Now I know that customs people like to work with rubber
stamps, and that it is easier to use forms, but as a lawyer interested
in issues I find it rather discomforting.
I would also say that the interest in having sufficient reasoning in
decisions is not just my own, but is required by Article 6(h) of the
GATT Code, 25 and the Treaty of Rome. 26 And just imagine how diffi-
cult it is for the business community, they have to function in the
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market without adequate information on a difficult subject, and yet,
very severe sanctions threaten their commercial operations.
Aside from the interest of the business community, I would also
say that the Antidumping Code is an international obligation and I
wonder, in light of Article 6(h) of the Code, what the EEC trading
partners can say about the four determinations that the Commission
and Council have handed down thus far. But all this is to show that
it would be nice for the exporters concerned to get the feeling that
they had their day in court and to see on what grounds they were
sentenced. Moreover, the whole trading community should know
whether the Code works as it was designed-that is, to punish unfair
competition rather than to be only a means to negotiate settlements
for which it was not designed.
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